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JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CHESTER

G.

0\

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

VERNIER AND ELMER

A. WILCOX.

Two decisions appearing in the issue of August 4, 1913, of the Pacific Reporter, one in Hager v. State, by the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma,
July 5, 1913, 133 Pac. (p. 623), and the other in Territory v. Lynch, by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, May 31, 1913, 133 Pac. (p. 405), it seems to
me contain expressions that are very significant.
The Oklah9ma court, after reciting quite fully what it evidently deemed
an outrageous method of proceeding on the part of the prosecution, said: "This
court stands squarely for the doctrine of harmless error, but it is equally committed to-the doctrine that fairness muft prevail in the trial of criminal cases.
We will not tolerate police court methods in courts of record. Trial courts
should confine the cross-examination of witnesses to legitimate subjects of
inquiry, and should not permit a witness to be brow-beaten or asked insulting

questions."
Now, in Heaven's name, why should such conduct be permissible, by implication at least, in a police court although properly the subject of severe
condemnation and treated as ground for reversal when occurring in a court of
record? Is not such conduct in reality more harmful to society at large, as
well- as more indefensible in its injury to the individual concerned, if there is
any distinction, in the police court where the ones least able to defend themselves, whether innocent or guilty, are on trial and appeal is comparatively
rare?
But the entire police department and private detective and police court
methods will go unchecked so long as the state does not provide a competent
and experienced public defender, equal in every respect to the public prosecutor,
and give such public defender all the necessary power to prevent and overcome
such abuses that privately retained defenders can possibly exercise now in
courts of record.
In the New Mexico case, the court notes the distinction between the extent
of resistance which may be allowable in cases of arrest by officers and by
persons who do not hold an official position, and says, "the law seeks to protect
the officer in the discharge of his duty, and calls upon the citizen to exercise
patience, if illegally arrested, because he knows he will be brought before a
magistrate, and will, if improperly arrested, suffer only a temporary deprivation
of his liberty."
But with our toleration of arrest by detectives of all kinds, and of keeping
incommunicado, and rushing from one jail and keeper to another, this pretense
of the law as to being brought before a magistrate and treated decently and
fairly has become an actual stench in the nostrils of the patient citizen and
makes the defective ones a greater menace to society. And there are judges
who do not hesitate to even praise, not being content with excusing, such
"police" executive if not court methods.
R. S. GRAY, of the San Francisco Bar.
74'
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Two IMPORTANT DECISIONS IN KANSAS.
The Supreme Court of Kansas at its sitting in January, handed down a number of decisions which would be of interest to the readers of this Journal. The
progressive tendency and common sense of the court isshown again, as usual, in
the decisions on criminal appeals. For example, in State v. Mattie Johnson,where
the journal entry showed that a defendant was sentenced under count six, instead
of count one, the Supreme Court permitted a new journal entry minc pro tunc,
after the appeal had been filed' in-the Supreme Court, and then sustained the conviction below. The matter of paroles, too, has received interpretation in the cases
of in re Carroll, and in re Welsh, petitioner. The bench was badly divided on
these questions, which related to paroles by city judges, and the court, three
concurring, one concurring specially, and three dissenting, held that the conditions of the parole could not extend beyond the term of the' sentence, and
hence where defendant was sentenced for six months, no punishment could be
imposed upon him after the end of the six months' period, even though he were
meantime on parole. I fear that until the legislature acts again, this has
destroyed all real value in the parole law so far as relates to cities, as I fear
the result will be that whatever respite from punishment a defendant can gain
is clear gain to him, without any compensating or corresponding power on part
of the court to punish further in case of disobedience. In other words, if a
man is sentenced to jail for thirty days and paroled for a period which under
the law may last two years, if he can induce the court now to parole him, all
he needs to do is to behave tolerably well for thirty days, and after that time.
he may snap his fingers at the court, knowing that it will be wholly incapable
of recommitting him to jail, or giving him any further punishment after the
thirty day limit has expired, whether he has been meantime in jail or not.
J.C. RuPPENTHAL, Judge 23rd Judicial District of Kansas.
VARIANCE CAUSED BY USE OF "STRANGLING" IN INDICTMENT AND "SMOTHER" IN
INSTRUCTION.

In Law rotes for February, 1914, we find the following interesting account
of an unfortunately typical kind of judicial decision:
"A good illustration of the protection afforded a defendant on a trial for
a crime is seen in the case of Lanier v. State, (Ga.) 80 S. E. 5. An indictment
charged the defendants, husband and wife, with the murder of their infant by
"choking, strangling, and by beating and striking." An instruction to the jury
stated that if the defendants acted in concert with each other it would make
no difference which "actually struck the blow, or choked, or smothered the
child; each would be responsible, regardless of who may have struck the fatal
blow." It was held by a majority of the court that there was a fatal variance
between the indictment and the instruction, entitling the husband, who was
convicted of the crime, to a new trial. The court said: "To smother is to
stifle, to suffocate by stopping the exterior air passages to the lungs; to strangle
is to suffocate by a pressure or constriction of the throat. The jury may have
believed that under the evidence the child was smothered and not strangled.
This instruction permitted them to find the defendant guilty of murder acconplished in a manner not charged in the indictment." The presiding justice and
Judge Lumpkin, refusing to take so technical a view, dissented, saying: "We
.do not think that a new trial should be granted on account of the instruction
contained in the fourth division of the opinion. The lexicons define both words
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to mean 'to stifle; to suffocate.'
Death accomplished by strangling results
from inability to inspire and expire air into and from the lungs, and death from
smothering results from the same physiological cause. The charge in the
indictment that death was produced by choking and by strangling indicates
that strangling was not limited to suffocation produced by a constriction of the
throat. While there may exist some technical difference in the terms, yet in
common speech one is generally understood as the equivalent of the other.
We do not think that the difference is so radical as to imply essentially different
means of producing death."
The only comment which the opinion of the majority seems to call
for is a reference to the language of Justice Gould in the early case of Coggs
v. Bernard (1703) 2 Lord Raymond 909, where, in referring to a particularly
vicious instance of judicial technicality, he said that it was "a thing no man
living that is not a lawyer could think of."

I.

MAURICE WORMsER,

New York City.

AccompLICE.

People v. Duffy, 144 N. Y. Supp. 699. Where the defendant asked F., who
had previously collected bribes for police protection, but had withdrawn or been
withdrawn from that position, for a list of persons from whom he had collected,
and told F. he was going to collect from them, F., who merely. furnished him
the list, was not an accomplice in the subsequent receiving by defendant of
bribes from such persons.
Though the trial court erroneously ruled a witness was an accomplice, his
testimony can on appeal be considered as that of one not an accomplice, and so
not requiring corroboration.
ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE COURT.

Curtis v. State, Ala. App., 63 So. 745. By letters written to the court. In
affirming a conviction of forgery, the Alabama Court of Appeals says that there
is no merit in the exceptions reserved, the defendant was protected by the trial
court in every legal right and was treated with due courtesy and consideration.
"The evidence of his guilt is, in our opinion, overwhelming and yet he has
enlisted in his behalf the sympathies of a number of philanthropic workers,
who have visited the jail during his confinement, and who have, apparently at
his instance, addressed to us numefous written appeals in the shape of letters,
begging for leniency and a reversal of the case here for a new trial below,
intimating, as expressed by some, that he had not had "a square deal" on the
former trial, basing their assertion, so far as appears, on mere hearsay. These
communications have no place in this court, and are highly improper; but,
believing the motives pompting them to have been sincere, and that they were
not designed by the authors in any evil purpose to improperly sway or influence
this court from the discharge of its duties, but rather originated in a misconception as to what those duties were, we shall take no action against the parties
in the matter, except to give this warning and express our disapproval in this
way of such appeals, and this with a hope of saving the necessity of having to
resort to other methods in the future to prevent a recurrence. The function of
this court is solely to review the questions of law presented by the record, and
a reversal or affirmance on an appeal is not a matter of discretion with us, but
of law; hence, urging upon us, with a viev' to obtaining a reversal, any other
consideration than the law is entirely out of place.
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BIGAMY.

Garner v. State, Ala. App., 64 So. 183. Marriage before age of consent.
Defendant was convicted of bigamy. The proof was that while under the age
of consent, being between fourteen and fifteen years of age, he contracted
a marriage, co-habited with his wife for a day or two, and left her. About five
years later he married another woman, and was prosecuted for contracting this
second marriage. The first marriage had not been annulled by judicial proceedings. The defendant offered evidence that when he left his first wife he
told her he "was no longer her husband and that she was no longer his wife,"
and that he then and there severed the marriage relation and disaffirmed the
marriage. The trial court excluded this evidence. Held that the first marriage
was only voidable and "could not be annulled or disaffirmed by the mere ipse
dixit of the defendant by renunciation or denial of it, or by his repudiation of
the wife at his election for this or that cause," but could be annulled only by the
state through a court having jurisdiction. Hence the evidence was properly
excluded and the conviction was affirmed.
BLOODHOUNDS.

Carter v. State, Miss. 64 So. 215. They must be corroborated. Defendant
was convicted of burglary. The proof was that a store had been entered and
some money stolen. Bloodhounds were put upon the trail of the thief, at least
thirty-two hours after the burglary, and followed it to the defendant's house,
and to the defendant in person. There was no other evidence to connect him
with the crime. He bore a good reputation for honesty in the community.
Held that while the fact that the bloodhounds when put upon the trail went to
the defendant was admissible as evidence of guilt, alone and unsupported it
was insufficient to sustain a conviction. "There must be other and human
testimony to convict.' The conviction was reversed.
BURGLARY.

People v. Walton, 144 N. Y. Supp. 308. Breaking and entering. Pen. Law
(Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) Sec. 404, declares that a person who, with intent to
commit a crime therein, breaks and enters a building, shall be guilty of burglary
in the third degree, and section 400, subd. 2, provides that the word "break," as
so used, means "opening, for the purpose of entering therein, by any means
whatever, any outer door of a building." Held that, where a prosecutor, having
loaded a wagon with merchandise, left it in a barn, closing the barn door,
without locking it, and defendant opened the door and took goods from the
wagon, he was guilty of breaking and entering sufficient to sustain a cQnviction
of burglary in the third degree.
CONSPIRACY.

People v. Davis, 144 N. Y. Supp. 284. Preventing exercise of lawful trade.
Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40), Sec. 580, subd. 5, provides that conspiracy
may consist of an agreement to prevent another from exercising a lawful trade
by force of threats, or by interfering or threatening to interfere with property
belonging to another, or with the use thereof. Section 583 declares that no
agreement except to commit a felony on the person of another, or to commit
,arson or burglary, amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act beside the agreement be done to effect the object thereof. Held, that an indictment charging
that at least three persons conspired to prevent L. from exercising the trade of
a horseshoer by threatening his customers to cause strikes on work on which
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their horses were used unless they refrained and refused to have their horses
shod by L., alleging the overt acts to consist in threats to the customers to
cause such strikes, sufficiently charged a conspiracy to oppress L. in the exercise
of his lawful calling.
CoNsTRUcTIoN

or STATUTES.

Thomas v. State, Ala. App., 64 So. 192. Carrying concealed weapons. The
defendant was convicted of carrying concealed weapons. The proof was that
he placed a pistol in his pocket, where it was concealed from view, and soon
after was arrested and the pistol taken by the officer. The defendant did not
take a step between the time when he put the pistol into his pocket and the
time when it was removed by the officer, but had stood still. He contended that
he had not "carried" the pistol as that word necessarily required locomotion.
Held that the word "carried"-' in the statute meant "to have concealed about the
person, or to bear concealed about the person" so that the concealed weapon
was so connected with the person that locomotion of the body would carry with
it the weapon as concealed. The conviction was affirmed.
Holley v. State, Ala. App., 63 So. 738. Shooting across highway. The
defendant was convicted under a statute making it is a misdemeanor to "discharge a gun or other firearm along or across any public road." The proof was
that the defendant while sitting in the rear end of a wagon which was traveling
along the center of a public road fired his gun to one side and consequently
across only a part of the road. The appellate court thought that the legislature
intended "that the greater (that is, the width of the whole road) should include
the lesser (that is, part of the public road)," as the statute was designed to
protect the lives and persons of those in or traveling on the public highways
from accidental shooting, and sustained the convcition.
DEMtURRER.

United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119. Question of obscenity not decided
by court on demurrer. In a prosecution under Cr. Code (Act March 4, 1909, c.
321, 35 Stat. 1129), Sec. 211, as amended by Act March 4, 1911, c. 241, Sec. 2, 3,
Stat. 1339 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1651), for sending an obscene book
through the mails, whether or not the book is obscene must be determined by
the jury under instructions, and the court on demurrer, even when the book is
stipulated into the record as a part of the indictment, has power only to decide
whether it is so clearly innocent that the jury should not pass on it at all.
Rule in Regina v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 36, disapproved.
ERROR. I

State v. Duff, Mo., 161 S. W. 683. Fair trial and proper record necessary.
The defendant was convicted of burglary on proof that he had been caught in
the act. The prosecuting attroney cross-examined the defendant as to his
having been arrested some seven or eight years before on a like charge and
the state introduced the testimony of two deputy sheriffs that they had previously arrested the defendant. No objection was made by the defendant. The
court held that the cross-examination and the above testimony were improper
as prejudicing the defendant before the jury and denying him a fair and impartial trial, but as the attention of the trial court was-not called to the matter
by an objection that this did not constitute reversible error.
The indictment charged burglary in the first count and larceny in the second.
The defendant was convicted of burglary but acquitted of larceny. The record
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stated that fhe defendant was "informed by the court that he stands charged
with larceny, and pleads not guilty," and failing to show cause why judgment
should not be pronounced against him was sentenced to the penitentiary. The
appellate court held that the judgment was invalid, as shown by the record,,
because the defendant was sentenced for a crime of which he had been acquitted
and because the record showed that he was sentenced not because he had been
tried and found guilty, but because he had pleaded not guilty, and said that if
there were no other error the case should be reversed and remanded for proper
sentence.
The record of the inpanelling and swearing of the trial jury stated that
"the jury being by the clerk sworn, and after the selection the following good
and lawful men of the county were chosen to try this cause," giving their names.
The appellate court held that this record was fatally defective. If the word sworn
in the record related to the examination on their voir dire, the record does not
sho that they were sworn to try the cause, if the word means that they were
sworn to try the cause, the record does not show that they were properly
examined on their voir dire. For this error the case was reversed and remanded
for new trial.
It will be noticed that the court had no way of knowing whether the jury
had been properly impanelled and sworn or not. The defect may have been
in the record rather than in the 'proceedings in the lower court. The record
did not affirmatively show that the proceedings below were defective. It simply
failed to allege that all necessary steps were taken. It would seem that the
appellate court might properly have relied upon the presumption that the acts
of the trial court were regular, in the absence of a showing to the contrary.
But even if the court should not rely upon this presumption, it should not be
necessary to reverse the verdict if the defect was simply in the record.
Commonwealth v. Croson, 243 Pa. 19. Error in limiting cross-examination.
On the trial of an indictment for murder where the defendant admitted the
killing but contended that the act was done in self-defense, and it appeared
that defendant Dad been the host at a party at which deceased was present;
that deceased had acted in an outrageous and violent manner, using vile language and assaulting other members of the party; that when deceased had
gone outside the house, several shots were heard; that after being induced by
defendant to leave the house he had come back and approached defendant, who
was seated by the fire, threatening to kill him, whereupon defendant raised his
shotgun and shot deceased dead, the court erred in limiting the cross-examination of the witnesses for the commonwealth to what took place at the particular
instant when the shots were fired. It was the right of the defendant to have
all the facts connected with the shooting fully and fairly disclosed by the prosecution, as well as by any witness which he might call in his behalf. Where in
uch case defendant offered evidence of good character the court erred in permitting the defendant to be cross-examined as to whether or not he had made
statements years before to the effect that he had shot a woman; and in allowing
the commonwealth to offer evidence in rebuttal of defendant's denial that he
had made such a staetment, without any offer to prove that he had actually done
such a thing. The evidence was not competent as affecting his reputation for
good character at the time of the commission of the homicide or for years
preceding it. The charge to the jury in such case was inadequate where the
jury were merely told that defendant, in his own house, had rights that would
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not attach to one outside with means of fleeing or escaping, but were given no
adequate explanation of the rights of one who, without fault of his own, is
assaulted in his own dwelling house by one who has no right to be there at
the time, and a judgment upon a verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree
was reversed.
J.L.
EVIDENCE.

People v. Katz, N. Y. 103 N. E. 305. Admissibility of evidence of other
crimes. The larceny with which defendant was charged being committed by
means of a conspiracy, requiring a large number of actors to carry out the
involved plot, and it being quite possible that his connection with the scheme,
confessed in certain phases, might, as claimed by him, have been without criminal knowledge or purpose on his part, evidence of his prior suggestion to
another of a scheme essentially the same is admissible, on the question of guilty
knowledge of intent, and this though such scheme was carried out; and likewise
testimony that such other person then expressed to defendant his opinion that
the proposed transaction was criminal, and also communicated to him the like
opinion of another. Hiscock, Collin, and Hogan, JJ., dissenting.
People v. Duncan, Ill. 103 Ill. 1043.

Admissibility of evidence of attempted

suicide. In a criminal prosecution, evidence that after accused's arrest he attempted to commit suicide is admissible, as tending to prove guilt of crime
charged.
FALSE PRETENSES.

People v. Warfield, Ill. 103 Ill. 979. Subject matter of the offense. An
instruction in a prosecution for conspiring to obtain money and property by
fase pretenses that whoever, with intent to cheat another, designedly, by any
false pretense, obtains the signature of another to any written instrument or
obtains from any person money, personal property, or other valuable things is
guilty of obtaining money and property by false pretenses was erroneous as
authorizing a conviction if the object of the conspiracy was to obtain prosecuting
witness' signature to any written instrument or obtain any vakiable thing from
her by false pretenses, when the obtaining of her signature to a book order
and to certain notes, as was done, would not be an offense.
FOOD.

People v. Frudenberg, N. Y. 103 N. E. 166. Construction and validity of
ordinance regulating sale of milk. New York City Sanitary Code, Sec. 183,
declaring that it shall be the duty of all persons having in their possession
receptacles containing milk to cleanse or cause them to be cleansed immediately
upon the emptying, and that no person shall receive or have in his possession
any such receptacle which has not been washed after holding milk or cream,
is a valid police regulation, being for the benefit of the public health, the expression "immediately" meaning "forthwith," and implying prompt and vigorous
action, but not being unreasonable, so as to prevent a dealer from retaking soiled
receptacles used for the conveyance of milk. A driver of a milkwagon who
collected unwashed receptacles, and, instead of taking them directly to a sterilizing plant, delivered them at a railroad station, where they were to be returned
to his master, is guilty of a violation of New York City Sanitary Code, See.
183, requiring the immediate cleansing of receptacles containing milk, and providing that no person shall receive or have in his possession any unwashed
receptacles. Willard, Bartlett and Miller, JJ., dissenting.
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INDICTMENT AND

INFORMATION.'

United States v. Breinzolm, 208 Fed. 492. Sufficiency. To make an indictment under Cr. Code (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321) Sec. 211, 35 Stat. 1129
(U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1651), for mailing a nonmailable letter, giving
information as to where and how and by whom and by what means certain acts
and operations could and would be done and performed for procuring and
pzoducing an abortion, the letter set out need not be such that a stranger would
know what information it gave, nor need the indictment contain explanatory
matter to show that the letter did give such information.
People v. Tait, Ill. 103 N. E. 750. Sufficiency. An information for violating
quarantine regulations, which alleged that the board of health having previously
established certain rules for the prevention of the spread of scarlet fever, and
"having directed" that accused, "his residence, and family be placed under
quarantine, because a member of his household was infected with a dangerously
communicable disease," in pursuance of said rules, and that accused did then
and there unlawfully violate such rules by disregarding the quarantine, did not
sufficiently show the existence of an emergency justifying the quarantine of
accused, since the person in accused's household alleged to have the fever
might not have been in his dwelling house at the time; "household" being
equivalent to "family."
People v. Gray, Ill. 103 N. E. 552. Waiver. Though a defendant can, in a
criminal case, by pleading to the indictment, waive all the irregularities in the
constitution of the grand jury, he cannot waive failure to swear the grand
jury, or any grand juror.
INSANITY.

Commonwealth v. Simanowicz, Pa. 89 At. 562. Preliminary inquest to
determine sanity. In the trial of a preliminary issue to determine the sanity of
accused, error in instructing that the burden was on accused to establish insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt was not cured by the withdrawal of the plea of not
guilty, entered by direction of the court when the prisoner stood mute and by
the entry on advice of counsel of a plea of guilty, the alleged insane person not
being bound by such plea.
JURORS.

State v. Schlosser, N. J. 89 Al. 522. Improper conduct as grdund for
review. During cross-examination of one of the state's witnesses, a juror
interrupted, asking what the inquiry had to do with the case, and stated that
they were busy men and were compelled to listen "to a lot of stuff" that had
nothing to do with the case. After the court had ruled that the examination
was proper, the juror again interpolated: "It is a waste of time." Held, that
such interruption though highly improper, was not, prejudicial to accused, it
appearing that the examination then being conducted had reference to matters
not applicable to the merits of the case.
MISNOMER.

Hinktom v. State, Ala. App., 64 So. 193. Name of defendant. An affidavit
charging assault and battery, stated that the defendant's name was "George
Hinktom, whose name is to affiant otherwise unknown." The warrant was issued
against George Hinktom. At the trial, prosecuting witness testified that he knew
defendant's name was "George Haughton" and not "Georgep Hinktom" and that
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he knew this when he made the affidavit. This evidence was undisputed. The
defendant was convicted, and appealed on the ground of variance between the
name as stated in the accusation and as proved. Held that the party charged
with crime has a substantial right to be so designated that there be proper record
evidence of his identity. When his name is known he must be designated
by it. If his name is alleged to be unknown and the proof shows that it was
known, there is a fatal variance. Hence the conviction was reversed. Iri
Thomas v. State, Ala. App., 64 So. 192, the court sustained an indictment

against "Arthur Thomas" where the plea in abatement alleged that his true and
correct name was. "Buddie Thomas," but admitted that he was known and called
by the name of "Arthur-Thomas."
NEUTRALITY.

United States v. Steinfeld .5" Co., 209 Fed. 904. What shipments forbidden.
Xeutrality Resolution, March 14, 1912, prohibiting the violation of neutrality by
shipment of munitions of war procured in the United States and exported to
an American country in which conditions of domestic violence exist, does not
prohibit the shipment of munitions of war from one point in the United States
to another, but only from a point in the United States to a point in a foreign
country; and hence an indictment merely alleging that defendants caused to be
made a shipment of munitions of war from New Haven, Conn., to Tucson,
Ariz., to be there trans-shipped to the state of Sonora, Mexico, as its ultimate
destination, merely charged an intent to violate the law, and was therefore
fatally defective.
PARENT AND

CHILD.

Neglected child. Burn's Ann. St. 1908,
Sec. 1643, defines a "neglected child" as any boy under 16 years of age or girl
under 17 years of age, who has not proper parental care, or is found living in a
house of ill fame, or with any vicious or disreputable persons, or whose home,
by reason of depravity- of its parent, is an unfit place for the child. After
accused's husband went to another town to work, she began to visit wine rooms
until late at night, and brought a man home with her, on a number of occasions,
and had sexual intercourse with him for hire until a late hour in a room near
where her young children were, and on one occasion had intercourse with a
man while another man had intercourse with her 17-year-old daughter in the
same room, thus practically making her apartments a house of prostitution.
Held, that accused's children were "neglected," within the statute, and she was
liable thereunder contributing to their neglect by virtually requiring them to
live in a disreputable house.
Dunn v. State, Ind. 103 N. E. 439.

REASONABLE DOUBT.

Hooten v. State, Ala. App. 64 So. 200. Possibility of guilt. On a trial for
murder, the court gave the following charge: "If you believe from all the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty, though you
may also believe that it is possible that he. is not guilty, you must convict him."
Held that the charge stated a correct proposition of law. The conviction was
affirmed.
SENTENCE.
O'Brien v. McLaughry, Warden, 209 Neb. 816. Discharge from sentence
illegal only in part. A prisoner confined in a federal penitentiary under a
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sentence imposing two terms on different counts of the indictment to be served
successively, the second of which terms is illegal, is entitled to be discharged
on habeas corpus from such part of the sentence, dlthough his first term has
not expired, -because of the effect which the illegal part of the sentence has on
his right to petition for parole after he has served one-third of the total of the
term or terms for which he was sentenced," under Act June 25, 1910, c. 387,
Sec. 1, 36 Stat. 819 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1702).
TRIAL.

People v. Hotz, Ill. 103 N. E. 1007. Improper request for instructions. It
was an imposition on the trial court to ask him to pass upon 52 instructions.
many of which covered the same ground as those given, dealt with the same
subject, differing only in phraseology, and assumed that matters excluded by
the court were in evidence.
People v. Annis, Ill. 103 N. E. 568. Reference to refusal of accused to
testify. Cr. Code (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 38), Sec. 426, provides that if a
defendant in a criminal case does not testify it shall not create a presumption
against him, nor shall the court permit any reference to be made to such neglect.
Held, where a defendant did not testify, a reference thereto by the state's
attorney by stating in argument, "For some reason not known to me and not
known to you, gentlemen, she did not testify and tell you anything about the
case or say one word in her behalf," was prejudicial error and was not cured
by the sustaining of objections to the remarks.
WITNESSES.

People v. Scott, 111. 103 N. E. 617. An officer in charge of the court, who
remains in court. notwithstanding a rule excluding the witnesses, is properly
permitted to testify.

